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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals upholding an Order 
of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss an Order to Show Cause and 
extending Defendant's formal AP&P probation. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). The Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded on the length of probation ordered (ten years). State v. Orr, 2004 UT App 
413, Add. 6. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County in and for the State of Utah 
wrongfully denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause and erroneously 
ruled the Court had jurisdiction to extend the Defendant's probation for a period often years 
(minus three years previously served on probation). "Whether the trial court had the 
authority to extend Defendant's probation is a question of law. We accord a trial court's 
conclusions of law no particular deference, reviewing them for correctness." State v. Wilcox, 
808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463-4 (Utah 1988). Also, 
"(b)ecause the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, we review for 
correctness." State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Grate, 947 
P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997). 
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This Court granted a Petition of Certiorari as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. Call 980 
P.2d 201,203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be notified of the State's 
intent to seek revocation, modification or extension of probation prior to the 
expiration of the existing probation term. 
2. Whether the district court made adequate findings, and whether 
the district court must find a probation violation is willful to impose an 
extension of probation. 
Add. 1. 
These issues were preserved in the lower court upon the Defendant's filing of a 
Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and Memorandum in 
Support thereof, and oral argument relating to said Motion, as well as the Judge's ruling 
denying Defendant's Motion (R. 234-378, 481; 386-394, Add. 2). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are relevant to the issues presented on appeal and are attached as 
Addendum 3 : 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2000) 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition below 
Defendant David J. Orr was initially charged with twenty-eight felonies including 
Securities Fraud, Communications Fraud, Unregistered Securities Agent and Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity (R. 2-8). On March 23,2000, Defendant entered a Change of Plea to the 
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amended charge of Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8) and 
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony (Count 20) (R. 20-21). On May 
12, 2000, Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to two 
indeterminate terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutively. 
At the same time, the Court suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on probation 
for three years to be supervised by the Utah Adult Probation & Parole Department ("AP&P") 
with numerous conditions, including that Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County 
Jail with no credit for time served, and pay restitution as determined by his probation officer. 
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward restitution or 25% 
of his income under the direction of AP&P (R. 22-27). 
Defendant performed satisfactorily during his three years (36 months) of probation, 
but on May 13,2003, Court records show that an AP&P Progress/Violation Report was filed 
with the Court (R. 228-229). On May 19,2003, an Order to Show Cause was entered by the 
Third District Court (signed on May 13,2003 by Judge Hanson) alleging that the Defendant 
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation "by having failed to pay restitution in 
full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the Probation Agreement." (Add. 4 & 
5) (R. 230-231,232-233). On or about May 23, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R. 
234-378). 
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The Court held a hearing on June 23,2003 and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
from the Bench (R. 3 83-3 84).l The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 
2,2003 formally denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and ruling 
that the Court had jurisdiction and authority to extend Defendant's probation for a maximum 
often years because the Court had sentenced the Defendant to two 0-5 year terms in the Utah 
State Prison, and had suspended those terms (Add. 2, R. 386-394). The Court also concluded 
that it was not required to place the Defendant on a bench probation as argued by the 
Defendant under the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-10(a)(ii)(A) (sic) "because the 
Defendant's probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i) (sic), but was 
instead tolled under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)" (Add. 2, p. 6, R. 391). 
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's Decision on July 9, 2003 (R. 
395-396). The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion for official publication in Case No. 
20030574-CA on November 12,2004 upholding the trial court's determination that the trial 
court had properly extended Defendant Orr's probation but reversing and remanding with 
direction that the trial court amend Orr's probation order to a period of no greater than three 
years rather than the ten years originally entered. Orr, \ 16, Add. 6. 
This Court granted a Petition of Certiorari as to the following issues: 
1
 The district court apparently combined the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss with the Probation Revocation hearing, although Defendant was not asked to 
admit or deny the allegations in the Order to Show Cause and no evidence was presented 
as to the Defendant's willful failure to pay restitution. Further the Judge made no specific 
written findings on the issues raised by Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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1. Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. Call 980 
P.2d201,203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be notified of the State's 
intent to seek revocation, modification or extension of probation prior to the 
expiration of the existing probation term. 
2. Whether the district court made adequate findings, and whether 
the district court must find a probation violation is willful to impose an 
extension of probation. 
Add. 1. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
1. Defendant David J. Orr was originally charged with twenty-eight felonies 
under the securities laws of the State of Utah (R. 2-8). 
2. On or about March 23, 2000, Defendant waived preliminary hearing and 
entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8 
amended) and Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent (Count 20) also a third degree felony (R. 
20-21). 
3. On May 12, 2000, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson and was sentenced to two terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison with 
the sentences to run consecutively. The Court suspended the prison terms and placed the 
Defendant on probation under certain specific conditions, including that the Defendant was 
required to pay restitution as determined by the Adult Probation & Parole Department. 
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward his restitution, or 
25% of his income, under the direction of the Adult Probation & Parole Department. The 
Court indicated a restitution hearing could be set upon appropriate application (R. 22-24,25-
29). 
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4. No report or allegation of probation violation was filed with the court between 
May 12, 2000 and May 13, 2003, except for the agent's testimony he filed his 
Progress/Violation Report on May 9, but someone at the court changed the date on the 
document to May 13. (R. 481, p. 11-14). 
5. Court records indicate that on May 13,2003, a Progress/Violation Report and 
Affidavit was filed by Probation Officer Robert Egelund requesting that the Court issue an 
Order to Show Cause requiring Defendant Orr to appear and show cause, if any he has, why 
his probation should not be revoked and he be committed to the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate term as provided by law, the execution of which had been previously stayed 
by the Court, "(B)y virtue of his having failed to pay restitution in full, as ordered, in 
violation of a special condition of the probation agreement." (R. 228-229, Add. 2,230-231). 
This was despite the fact that he paid monthly payments faithfully until instructed by his 
lawyer on May 12,2003 that his probation terminated by operation of law. (R. 1, p. 32,1.11-
16). 
6. The Defendant was served with the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause on May 
19, 2003 requiring him to appear before the Court on May 30, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. by Agent 
Egelund. (Add. 5, p. 2, R. 232-233). 
7. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause and 
Memorandum in Support thereof for lack of jurisdiction on or about May 22,2003 (R. 234-
235, 236-378). 
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8. On or about June 23, 2003, the Court held a hearing regarding Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss at which the Defendant was present and represented by his attorney Larry 
R. Keller and the State was present through its attorney Assistant Salt Lake County District 
Attorney Howard R. Lemcke, Jr. (R. 383-384). 
9. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on or about July 2,2003 
(Add. 2, R. 386-394). 
10. Defendant Orr filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9, 2003 (R. 395-396). 
11. The Utah Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Opinion on November 12, 
2004. 
12. This Court granted Certiorari on March 30, 2005 {See Add. 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of Defendant that his probation ended by operation of law on May 
12, 2003, and the court lost jurisdiction over him at that time because he was not provided 
notice of the court's action to extend, modify or terminate probation until May 19, 2003. 
This Court's decisions in State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999), State v. Green, 757 P.2d 
462 (Utah 1988), and Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) all stand for the proposition 
that a probationer is entitled to due process of law which requires that the State must take 
definitive action to extend the term of his probation before the expiration date of the 
probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent prior to said expiration date. 
In Defendant Orr's case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant 
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intentionally was not notified by his probation officer until May 19,2003 of the court's intent 
to take action to extend his probation. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court had no authority to extend his probation 
because it did not enter any finding that he had violated a condition of his probation, let alone 
any finding that such a violation was willful. Defendant relies on this Court's decision in 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979) and the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for this proposition. Defendant 
maintains that without a finding of a willful violation of probation, a probationer's probation 
may not extended, modified or revoked if he has otherwise satisfied his original conditions 
of probation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF 
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST 
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE HE 
WAS NOT PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S ACTION 
UNTIL MAY 19, 2003. 
Although there was controversy in the trial court regarding the precise date that 
documents prepared by AP&P were "filed", there was no conflicting evidence regarding the 
date upon which the Defendant was served with notice of the Order to Show Cause. The 
Defendant was served on May 19, 2003, at least seven days after his probation should have 
terminated by operation of law according to the Court's records (Add. 5, p. 2, R. 232, 233). 
Furthermore, Agent Egelund testified at the hearing in the above-entitled matter that he did 
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not serve the Defendant until May 19,2003 because "(T)hat was the soonest I was going to 
see him." Mr. Egelund admitted that he didn't make any extra effort to notify him of the 
Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the Court would revoke, extend or 
modify his probation until May 19th. (R. 481, p. 22,1. 8-20). Furthermore, Agent Egelund 
admitted that he informed the Defendant prior to May 12, 2003 that his intention was to 
recommend to Judge Hanson that his probation be terminated and the matter of restitution 
be handled through the civil process as a judgment (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14). 
In addition to the foregoing, the Court itself, in making its comments at the Order to 
Show Cause hearing on June 23, 2003, made the following statement: 
THE COURT: Mr. Keller, when Mr. Egelund came down he says, "Mr. Orr's 
probation is going to terminate. We don't want to deal with him any more," 
and I said, "Wrong. I want you to deal with him. I want probation to continue, 
because he won't pay unless I am holding the prison term over his head," 
which is evidenced by the fact that he apparently hasn't made the May 
payment or the June payment. 
(R. 481, p. 30,1.3-9). 
Therefore, the evidence is clear that Defendant was led by his probation officer to 
believe that the probation officer was going to recommend termination and that his probation 
would be terminated and he would be required to continue to pay restitution as part of the 
civil process. It was a shock to Defendant when he was served with the Order to Show 
Cause on May 19,2003. 
It is the contention of Defendant that his probation ended by operation of law on May 
12, 2003, and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time, because he was not provided 
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notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah 
App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a trial court lost jurisdiction to initiate 
probation extension proceedings against the probationer upon expiration of probation. In that 
case, Defendant had been sentenced on October 11, 1985 after pleading guilty to a single 
count of attempted sodomy on a child, a first degree felony. Defendant's probation was to 
expire by operation of law on May 6, 1987 by virtue of his having completed eighteen 
months on probation. Although the Adult Probation & Parole department generated a 
memorandum directed to the trial court which suggested extending the Defendant's probation 
because he needed to continue in treatment, no motion was filed or made by the AP&P agent 
or prosecutor to extend Defendant's probation. The Court of Appeals there noted that, 
although the trial court was apparently made aware of the recommendation and a hearing was 
scheduled, the Defendant received nothing in writing and only learned of the hearing when 
advised thereof casually by a hospital aid two days before the hearing date. The court then 
extended Defendant's probation for an additional eighteen months. Id. at 1065. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "(I)t is well settled that a probationer shall be 
accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation seriously 
deprives a person or his or her liberty." (citations omitted)... Id. at 1067. . Although the 
Court went on to note that the matter was less clear with regard to probation extension 
proceedings, "...because of the high risk of prejudice to the probationer when he or she is not 
given notice of the extension hearing and the hearing is conducted ex-parte, these courts have 
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invoked their supervisory powers requiring the necessary parties to (1) give the probationer 
notice of the extension hearing; (2) advise the probationer that he or she has a right to a 
hearing and/or (3) advise the probationer that he or she has the right to the assistance of 
counsel." (citations omitted) Id. at 1067. 
The Court then specifically ruled: "We hold that a probationer in the State of Utah is 
accorded a measure of due process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled 
to the available protections." Id. 
In the instant case, Defendant Orr was not notified of any type of action being taken 
against him until May 19, 2003, seven days after his probation terminated by operation of 
law. 
This issue was elucidated even more clearly by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case 
of State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997). In that case, defendant was sentenced 
on January 16, 1987 to 1-15 years in prison and was placed on 18 months probation. The 
Adult Probation & Parole Department filed an Incident Report with the trial court on June 
12,1987 alleging Grate had violated his probation by being arrested for auto burglary. Grate 
had been arrested on July 8, 1987 on the court's bench warrant based upon the Incident 
Report and the court noted that Grate's 18-month probation period was due to terminate on 
July 15, 1988. However, because AP&P did not file its Affidavit in Support of an Order to 
Show Cause until July 21,1988 and Grate was not served with the Order to Show Cause 
until August 9, 1988 the court ultimately ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
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proceed with the Order to Show Cause as defendant's probation had terminated by operation 
of law on July 15, 1988. 
In the Grate case, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Under Utah law, it is the notice to a person of the commencement of a judicial 
enforcement action that distinguishes the filing of an information in a criminal 
proceeding or the issuance of an OSC in a probation setting, from the filing of 
an incident report. In each of the former instances, there is no ambiguity as to 
the State's intention to enforce its rights within a judicial proceeding or the 
defendant's need to prepare a defense. Furthermore, all the procedural 
structures which attach to a court proceeding are activated. 
In contrast, the filing of an incident report does not commence a probation 
revocation proceeding. See, Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-29(1) (1987). Such 
report need not be served on the probationer, nor does the filing necessarily 
activate any court proceeding or require the probationer to respond. See 
Id. Indeed, a probationer may never learn about the filing of such a report... 
. rather, it is only when a probationer is served with an OSC that the 
probationer receives actual notice of the state's decision to proceed 
against the probationer for any violations.... 
(Emphasis supplied) 947 P.2d at 1165. 
The Court of Appeals found that the critical element involved in the process was 
notice to the probationer that action was to be taken against him. The court went on to state: 
Most obviously, the notice must inform the probationer of the specific 
violations the state believes he or she has committed. Equally important, 
however, is that such notice inform the probationer that he or she is being -
rather than may at some future date be - called into court to respond to the 
state's allegations . . . 
However, Grate received no notice within his initial probation term of an 
imminent need to appear in court to respond to those allegations.... 
We conclude that a probationer is not charged with a probation violation 
within § 77-18-l(8)(a) until he or she has received written notice both of 
the nature of the allegations against him or her and of the pendency of an 
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enforcement action in the trial court requiring a response. We further 
conclude that because Grate was not charged with a probation violation within 
the original term of his probation, his probation terminated as a matter of law 
on July 15,1988, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Grate's 
probation on August 12,1988. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of 
Grate's 1999 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. 
(Emphasis supplied). 947 P.2d at 1168. 
In the Grate case, the Court of Appeals analyzed the previous cases of this Court 
which it believed supported its decision in that case. The Court of Appeals looked at Smith 
v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) and noted that this Court had reviewed a proceeding in 
which an affidavit supporting an Order to Show Cause was filed within the probationer's 
term but the Order to Show Cause was not served on the probationer until after that term had 
expired. The Grate court observed ". . . In rejecting the state's argument that filing of the 
affidavit tolled the running of the probationer's term, the court focused on both 'the nature 
and degree of notice to which an individual is entitled (under §77-18-1) prior to a revocation 
hearing.' Id. at 795". 947 P.2d at 1166. 
As the Grate court noted, this Court in Smith v. Cook concluded 
. . . (T)hat the "emphasis on notice . . . is consistent with the assertion that a 
court retains authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served with 
notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation period" and that the 
"assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the period of probation 
in order for the court to retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent 
with the rationale underlying our decision in Green'' Cook, 803 P.2d at 795 
(emphasis added). This court later reiterated that proper notice must be 
"'reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.'" Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted)). 
(Emphasis in original) Id. at 1166. 
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This decision in State v. Grate by the Utah Court of Appeals was handed down on 
October 30, 1997. It should be noted that the tolling statute relied upon by the district court 
in the instant case, Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (1996) (as amended in 1989) was in full 
force and effect. The Utah Court of Appeals in that case reversed a trial court that had 
denied Grate's motion (essentially a motion to dismiss the probation revocation proceedings) 
on the basis that the filing of the Incident Report on June 12, 1987 had tolled the running of 
Grate's probation under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) until the OSC was signed on July 19, 1988. The 
trial court had rejected Grate's claim that the tolling of the probation period without notice 
to him had violated his due process rights. As indicated, the Court of Appeals reversed. 
The Grate court considered this tolling provision of Utah law and determined that it 
had no force and effect because of the failure of the State of Utah to have served the 
defendant with the Order to Show Cause until several days after his probation was due to 
terminate. Because the defendant was denied legal notice, it was a violation of his right to 
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 
See, Grate at 1163, 1167.2 
2
 Although the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in the case of State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 
152 (Utah App. 1997) that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (1995) prevented the court from being 
required to dismiss that particular case for lack of jurisdiction because a violation report 
was filed with a trial court and a warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued, the court 
found that the defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah without 
permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served." Id. at 
153. Because this case was decided several months prior to the Grate case, and because it 
is clear that the defendant had left the jurisdiction and could not be served with the 
court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant Orr maintains that this case is 
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The district court in the instant case relied on this same tolling provision of the Utah 
Code to deny Defendant Orr's Motion to Dismiss (Add. 4, p. 7, R. 392). It is clear that 
Defendant Orr was not served with notice of AP&P's Incident Report and the OSC until 
seven days after his probation ended by operation of law. This and the fact that he was lulled 
into believing that the Adult Probation & Parole Department and the Court would terminate 
his probation on May 12, 2003 should be a dispositive factor in this Court's analysis. 
Defendant's due process rights under both Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were violated in this circumstance, much the same 
as defendant Grate's rights were held to have been violated by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
his situation. 
This Honorable Court weighed in on this important constitutional issue in State v. 
Call 980 P.2d 201 (Utah 1999). This Court reiterated the proposition that: 
(Prior) cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the 
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive 
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer 
must be given notice of that intent otherwise the probationer is left in a state 
of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his 
probation. 
(Emphasis added). 980 P.2d fl 1 at 203. 
inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him. Reedy's due process rights 
were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and leaving the state so he could 
not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant case. If it were otherwise, 
the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as precedent. Reedy was decided April 
17, 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997. Davis, P.J. sat on both panels. 
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The court cited its previous cases in State v. Green, 157 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and 
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) for this proposition, and clearly indicated in Call 
that this principle was still good law in this State. However, due to the fact that the defendant 
in Call had signed a waiver of personal appearance, and a waiver of his right to a hearing and 
an agreement to extend his probation for an additional year prior to the date that the 
probation terminated by operation of law, the court ruled against the defendant in that 
particular case. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, this court clearly stated that due 
process requires that the state must take definitive action to extend the term before the 
expiration date of the probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent. 
In Defendant Orr's case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant 
wasn't notified until May 19, 2003 of the Court's action. 
Defendant Orr was clearly prejudiced in that he did not make his May or June 
payments based upon his counsel's advice, thinking his probation had terminated by 
operation of law and his case would be handled as a civil matter as advised by his probation 
officer, before the officer saw Judge Hanson on the issue. (See R. 1, p. 32,1. 11-16). This 
put him in jeopardy with the court and could have resulted in his incarceration. (R. 481, p. 
39,1.11-17). 
Despite the foregoing, the Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision in this 
matter made light of and passed over this very important constitutional due process 
requirement. After quoting the applicable language regarding this issue from State v. Call, 
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supra, the Utah Court of Appeals, clearly understanding the decision of this Court in Call 
made the following statement: "We are not convinced that the limited delay between the 
filing of the AP&P Violation Report on May 9th and Orr's receipt of notice on May 19th 
creates such problems." Orr, If 11 FN. 5. 
The very fact that the Utah Court of Appeals in the instant case chose to deal with this 
very important Utah and United States Constitutional right to due process of law by a mere 
footnote with a cryptic statement that is difficult to fully understand, shows the result-
oriented decision that the Utah Court of Appeals had determined to enter in this matter. 
There is no analysis nor explanation of any case law or any other principle which suggests 
that the decisions of this Court in State v. Call supra, State v. Green, supra, and Smith v. 
Cook, supra, not to mention its own decision in State v. Grate, supra, should be based solely 
upon the question of the reasonableness of the time that had elapsed between the termination 
of the defendant's probation by operation of law, and service of notice on the defendant of 
the Order to Show Cause regarding the probation violation. 
This failure of the Utah Court of Appeals to review and analyze the Defendant's due 
process rights in light of this Court's cases cited in Defendant's Brief as precedent (and cited 
herein) as well as its own case precedent establishes clearly that the Court of Appeals decided 
a question of state law in a way that is in conflict with decisions of this Court when it ruled 
that Defendant Orr was not entitled to due process of law by receiving notice of the State's 
intention to extend the probationary period before its termination by operation of law. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO EXTEND 
PROBATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT ENTER ANY FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION OF HIS 
PROBATION, LET ALONE ANY FINDING THAT SUCH A 
VIOLATION WAS WILLFUL. 
Under Utah law, "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer 
has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (2003) 
(emphasis supplied). Furthermore, "[pjrobation may not be revoked except upon a hearing 
in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12)(a)(ii) (2003). In other words, the sentencing court must reveal both "the 
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation" in order "to enable a reviewing 
court to accurately determine the basis for the trial court's decision." State v. Hodges, 798 
P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 
(Utah 1979) (noting that the reviewing function of an appellate court is seriously undermined 
where findings are insufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which ultimate conclusions 
are reached—in the context of a civil case, where no liberty interest was at stake). In the 
instant case, the district court ordered Defendant Orr's probation extended, but entered no 
"finding that the conditions of probation ha[d] been violated[,]" as required under section 77-
18-l(12)(a)(0 or (ii). Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ordering an extension of 
Defendant Orr's formal probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i). 
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In the context of an allegation that probation has been violated by a failure to pay 
restitution, the standards are even stricter. Where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a 
fine and/or restitution, the sentencing court "must either find that probationer was at fault or 
that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the state's interests in 
punishment and deterrence." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (citing Bear den v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660, 662 (1983)). As the Hodges court stated, "[w]e believe that... in order to revoke 
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful." Hodges, 
798 P.2d at 276. In the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution (i.e. as grounds for 
revocation/modification of probation), "a finding of willfulness merely requires a finding that 
the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." State 
v. Petersen, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations, citation omitted; 
emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court made no finding that Defendant 
Orr had violated any term of his probation, let alone that such an alleged violation was 
willful. Without finding both a violation and willfulness (i.e. the absence of bona fide 
efforts to pay restitution), the district court had no basis for ordering an extension of his 
probation, even if this Court rules it still had jurisdiction.3 In fact, as noted previously, 
3
 If this Court chooses to reverse and remand on this issue, it is respectfully 
requested the Court decide the other issue as well, because once the Court issues findings 
upon remand, the same issue will need to be appealed again. Judicial economy should 
dictate this result. "Although resolution of the above issue is dispositive of the present 
case, where an appellate court finds that it is necessary to remand a case for further 
proceedings, it has the duty of cpass[ing] on matters which may then become material.'" 
Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 12, 20 P.3d 388, 393. 
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Defendant Orr faithfully made his monthly restitution payments until the date he believed his 
probation terminated by operation of law, and strictly complied with all other terms of his 
probation for the entire thirty-six months. He therefore clearly made bona fide efforts to 
meet the conditions of his probation. 
POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING PROBATION 
BEYOND THE STATUTORILY MANDATED TIME FRAME 
AND STRUCTURE. 
This Court did not grant certiorari on the issue raised by Defendant in the Court of 
Appeals that the district court exceeded its authority in ordering probation beyond the 
statutorily mandated time frame and structure; and so it is presumed that this Court in its final 
decision in this case, will simply affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court 
in ordering the Defendant on formal probation for ten years and remanding the case to the 
district court for resentencing in accordance with its Opinion {See Add 6, State v. Orr, supra 
11115, 16). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant herein respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Utah Court of 
Appeals and order the matter remanded to the Third District Court for the purpose of entering 
an Order of Termination of Probation based upon the failure of the trial court to have 
provided notice to Defendant of its intention to extend his probation until after his probation 
was scheduled to terminate by operation of law. 
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Furthermore, if this Court declines to reverse on the issue of due process notice as 
indicated above, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse and remand to the district 
court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine whether or not Defendant willfully 
violated any condition of his probation, and instructing the district court that if it cannot so 
find, Defendant's probation must be terminated. It is requested that the district court be 
ordered to enter appropriate findings no matter what its determination with regard to the 
alleged willfulness of Defendant's violation of probation. 
Finally, this Court is asked to note in its decision that the finding of the Utah Court 
of Appeals that the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction by extending Defendant's 
probation for a period often years was improper, is the law of the case and the district court 
should hold further proceedings, for the purpose of vacating its Order for probation extension 
for ten years and providing for probation extension as allowed by law. 
Dated this J L day of ^ W l 2005. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Lv 
^UL^ 
KELLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
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\ktM^/hffi 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN Thri SUPREME COURT OF THE STAl^ OF UTM&AH APPELLATE COUP 
ooooo MAR 3fl 2005 
State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. 
David J. Orr, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 20041057-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on December 8, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the due process concerns recited in State v. 
Call, 980 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1999) require that a probationer be 
notified of the State's intent to seek revocation, modification, 
or extension of probation prior to the expiration of the existing 
probation term. 
2. Whether the district court made adequate findings, and 
whether the district court must find a probation violation is 
willful to impose an extension of probation. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date / Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
ADDENDUM 2 
Third Judicial Distnci 
JUL - 2 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
BY- • Deputy ClerK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 001902772 
vs. : 
DAVID JAY ORR, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23, 
2003, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to 
Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction. The State elicited testimony 
from Robert Egelund, the defendant's AP&P officer. The Court 
received into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's 
copies of the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit in 
Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of which were originally 
filed with the Court). 
Following Mr. Egelund's testimony and oral argument from the 
prosecution and counsel for the defendant, the Court ruled from the 
bench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied and that he 
was to make up the May and June restitution payments. The Court 
took under advisement the issue of whether the defendant's 
probation may be extended to the limit or term of the original 
sentence. The Court also indicated to counsel that a more thorough 
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discussion of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to 
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court 
would issue. Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (the State did not file a-_response) and having considered 
counsel's arguments and Mr. Egelund's testimony, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this 
Court lacks the jurisdiction to initiate probation extension 
proceedings against him because these proceedings were not 
initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation 
of law. The defendant's argument is based on an erroneous 
presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2003, and that 
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03, 
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed. 
The legal analysis of whether this Court has the jurisdiction 
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when 
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the 
defendant's probation would have terminated. As an aside, the 
Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court 
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given 
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential 
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the 
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defendant, such a Report is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking an 
extension of his probation, even if it had been timely filed. 
The Court concludes that the styling of the report is 
unimportant given that the Court has a wide latitude and 
flexibility in determining whether probation should be revoked or 
modified (including the possibility of extending the probationary 
term) . Because it is the Court and not AP&P that fashions these 
remedies, how AP&P chooses to style the reports that it files with 
the Court has no import in the Court's ultimate determination of 
the appropriate remedy. In this case, the Court opts for extending 
the defendant's probation, as opposed to revoking it altogether. 
Therefore, the Court will refer to these proceedings as a probation 
extension proceeding. Having addressed the defendant's argument on 
this point, the Court proceeds to analyze the timing of the filings 
that initiated this probation extension proceeding. 
Under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1(11) (b) , " [t]he running of 
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court." The first issue therefore becomes 
when the Progress/Violation Report was filed and whether it tolled 
the running of the defendant's probation period under §77-18-
1(11)(b). 
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The filing date for the Progress/Violation Report was 
established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund. Mr. Egelund 
testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 2003, and 
pursuant to that, meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date 
for the purpose of filing the Progress/Violation Report and the 
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause. Mr. Egelund 
specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, he brought copies of 
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and left them in 
the intake basket for the Court's clerk. In support of this 
testimony, Mr. Egelund offered his copies of the Progress/Violation 
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked 
Exhibits 1 and 2). A review of these documents indicates hand-
written changes to the May 9, 2003, date-stamp to reflect a date of 
May 13, 2003. However, the copy of Order to Show Cause attached to 
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) has no such hand-written 
change. This copy of the Order to Show Cause clearly shows a date-
stamp of May 9, 2003. Taking together the documentary evidence 
before the Court in light of Mr. Egelund's credible testimony, the 
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit 
were filed on May 9, 2003, but that for reasons that the Court need 
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to 
reflect an apparent date that the documents were docketed. 
However, the pivotal date under §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of 
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docketing, but rather the date of filing. In this case, this date 
is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered 
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2003, and that he 
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003. 
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the 
issuance of an order to show cause. The documents in this case 
reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance of the 
Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003. Having established the dates 
of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the 
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate 
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination 
of the defendant's probation.1 
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May 
12, 2000. The Court reasons that the first day of probation would 
have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the 
close of business on the following day, May 13, 2000. Therefore, 
1
 During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made 
by the Court at a February 16, 2 0 01, hearing, as providing the 
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's 
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that 
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate 
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not 
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a 
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the 
Court does not rely on the February 16, 2001, date in its 
analysis. 
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law on 
May 13, 2 0 03, the termination date of the defendant's 36-month 
probationary period. Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the 
Progress/Violation Report on May 9, 2 0 03, and this Court's 
authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003, 
both occurred prior to the legislative termination of the 
defendant's probation. The defendant's probation period was 
therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12, 
2003. 
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its 
legislative termination sounds a death knell to two of the 
defendant's principal arguments. First, the defendant argues that 
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A), this Court can retain jurisdiction over 
him' only under the form of a bench probation. However, this 
provision never comes into play because the defendant's probation 
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10(a)(i), but was instead 
tolled under §77-18-1(11) (b) . 
Second, the defendant argues that the due process concerns of 
State v. Call, 980 P. 2d 201 (Utah 1999) , have been violated in this 
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend 
his probation before the expiration of his probation period. Once 
again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because 
the defendant's probation did not expire, it was tolled. 
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Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show 
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period and was 
therefore appropriate under due process considerations. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has 
jurisdiction to extend the defendant's probation because the 
probation extension proceedings were initiated prior to the 
legislative termination of the probation period and served to toll 
the probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss is therefore denied. 
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the 
defendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of 
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 36-month 
intervals or for the full duration of his remaining 10-year 
sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutively) . 
The Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute 
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law 
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and 
probation to its essence provides that while the Court has a large 
measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively 
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). 
Further, the Court can find no express limitation on the 
permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together 
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with any extensions, not exceed the legislatively established 
sentencing guidelines. 
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that 
it has the discretion to extend the_defendant's probation up to the 
remaining term of the Court's original sentence (equating to 10 
years). The defendant's failure to pay the May and June 
installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the 
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the 
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over 
him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making 
restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the 
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the 
defendant's probation for the maximum length permissible, the 
remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and extending his 
probation in the manner indicated above. 
Dated this .day of'^n&f 2 003 . 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry R. Keller 
Attorney for Defendant 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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ADDENDUM 3 
77-18-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. 
77-18-2. 
77-18-3. 
77-18-4. 
77-18-5. 
77-18-5.5. 
77-18-6. 
77-1&-6.5. 
77-18-7. 
77-18-8. 
77-18-8.3. 
Suspension of sentence — Pleas 
held in abeyance — Probation 
— Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Stan-
dards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Ter-
mination, revocation, modifi-
cation, or extension — Hear-
ings — Electronic monitoring. 
Repealed. 
Disposition of fines. 
Sentence — Term — Construc-
tion. 
Reports by courts and prosecut-
ing attorneys to Board of Par-
dons and Parole. 
Judgment of death — Defen-
dant to select method — Time 
of selection. 
Judgment to pay fine or restitu-
tion constitutes a lien. 
Liability of rescued person for 
costs of emergency response. 
Costs imposed on defendant — 
Restrictions. 
Fine not paid — Commitment. 
Special condition of sentence 
during incarceration — Pen-
alty. 
Section 
77-18-8.5. Special condition of probation — 
Penalty. 
77-18-9. Definitions. 
77-18-10. Petition — Expungement of 
records of arrest, investiga-
tion, and detention — Eligi-
bility conditions — No filing 
fee. 
77-18-11. Petition — Expungement of 
conviction — Certificate of el-
igibility -— Fee -— Notice — 
Written evaluation — Objec-
tions — Hearing. 
77-18-12. Grounds for denial of certificate 
of eligibility — Effect of prior 
convictions. 
77-18-13. Hearing — Standard of proof— 
Exception. 
77-18-14. Order to expunge — Distribu-
tion of order — Redaction — 
Receipt of order — Adminis-
trative proceedings — Divi-
sion requirements. 
77-18-15. Retention of expunged records 
— Agencies. 
77-18-16. Penalty. 
77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(?) ^ On 3 T>le?» ^ f crvnl+v trnf l ty ?*rtrl rnpnra l ly i l l no rontp^t or rnnvirfr ion 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
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(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court, 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety, and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a. Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
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sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(hi) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant, has no I received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
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(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (lOXaXi), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
uf a h e a r i n g b j tu.6 piTGua.tlOu.ei Oi apun a uc<mng ol id a finning i n 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
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(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Nutwilualanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
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(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
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Amendment XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
UECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art 1 § 7 
chambeau, 1991, 820 P.2d 920 Criminal Law 
&> 1030(2) 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law] 
No] 
of law, 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
ADDENDUM 4 
TILED 
IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY 
IN A N D FOR THE STATE OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
V S 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff, 
DEPUTY CLERK 
lAFFTDAVTT TN SUPPORT OF 
:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
: C O U R T C A S E N O : 001902772 
Defendant, :JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
iDEFATTY: Larry R. Keller 
) S T A T E OF U T A H 
C O U N T Y OF SALT LAKE 
ROBERT EGELLND, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a 
Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 23rd day of March, 
2 0 0 0 , the above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime o f Real Estate Broker/Agent 
With Out License, 3rd D« gree Felony, Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony, in the above-entitled 
Court and on the 12th day o f May, 2000, was sentenced to serve a term o f 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison; that the execution o f the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed 
on probation under the supervision o f the Department o f Corrections; that the above-entitled 
defendant did violate the terms and conditions o f the defendant's probation as follows, to -wi t 
/v\<W / ' " L i T -
RE: ORR, David Jay 
1. By having failed to pay restitution in foil, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the 
Probation Agreement 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order from the Court issue directing and 
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any 
he/she has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant 
should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
JLjto. ROB: PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
NOTARY PUB 
Residing: Utah 
Commission expires: 
ADDENDUM 5 
IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff; 
Defendant, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COURT CASE NO: 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds 
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions 
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of 
defendant's probation is justified. 
IX IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the 
day of tfJajsi 20^jat the hour of ff'^^then and there to show cause why probation °f HjOM 
of said defendant should jot be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations 
contained in the AfSdavi; on file with the Court. 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and 
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has 
a right to present evidence as provided in the Utaji Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED THIS IZS day oV iq/Lt/j 20J2-*2> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was 
personally served upon the defendant at ^yrwv 5 Iff Ll- (yif^^jf ypy showing the 
original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the \^f day of 
M f t ^ 20QJ additional copies were delivered to frittf) AlTnnUJfrf \ counsel for 
the defendant, on the JjJ^ day of / / / f t f 20^J 
ROBERT EGEL1 PROBATION OFFICER 
ADDENDUM 6 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Jay Orr, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030574-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 12, 2004) 
I2004 UT App 413 I 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne. 
THORNE, Judge: 
\ \ David Jay Orr appeals the trial court's extension of his 
probation. Orr argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to 
the expiration of his original probation period. We affirm all 
aspects of the trial court's decision except for the length of the 
extension of Orr's probation. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 Orr pleaded guilty to two third degree felonies in connection 
with alleged fraud and securities violations. On May 12, 2000, the 
trial court sentenced Orr to two consecutive prison terms of zero-to-
five years. The court suspended all but six months of the prison time 
and placed Orr on thirty-six months probation under the supervision 
of the Utah Adult Probation and Parole Department (AP&P) . The court 
also ordered Orr to pay $355,504.39 in restitution, with directions 
that Orr was "to pay no less than $1,000 per month towards 
restitution, or 25% of [his] income, under direction of AP&P." 
\2 During his probation, Orr made thirty-four monthly payments of 
approximately $1080. In May 2003, shortly before Orr's probation 
period was due to expire, AP&P filed a probation violation report 
stating that Orr had paid only $34,553.20 in restitution. AP&P 
characterized this as a probation violation and asked the court to 
order Orr to show cause as to why his probation should not be 
revoked. The date stamp on the report reflected a filing date of May 
9, 2003. The court issued an order to show cause on May 13, and the 
order was served on Orr on May 19. 
1(4 Orr moved to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of 
jurisdiction. Orr argued that his probation expired by operation of 
law on May 12, and that to continue his probation AP&P needed to file 
its report and serve him with notice before that date. Based upon a 
handwritten adjustment to the date stamp on the violation report, Orr 
argued that the report had been filed one day late, on May 13. Orr 
also argued that he had not been served with notice of the alleged 
violation until May 19. Orr failed to make restitution payments in 
either May or June 2003. 
1)5 On June 23, 2003, the trial court held a hearing to consider 
Orr's motion to dismiss. AP&P agent Robert Egelund testified that he 
had filed the report on May 9, 2003. The trial court, relying on 
Egelundfs testimony as well as the date stamp on the report, found 
that the report was filed on May 9, three days before the expiration 
of Orr's probation. The court ruled that the timely filing of the 
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report tolled Orr's probationary period pursuant to Utah Code section 
77-18-1 (11) , (1) and that this tolling provided the court with 
jurisdiction to extend Orr's probation despite the May 19 service on 
Orr. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003). 
16 The trial court then extended Orr's probation for the full ten-
year term of Orr's suspended prison sentences. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
17 Orr challenges the trial court's extension of his probation 
pursuant to Utah Code section 77-18-1. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 
(2003). "Because the interpretation and application of a statute is a 
question of law, we review whether the trial court had jurisdiction 
to extend defendant's probation for correctness." State v. Martin, 
1999 UT App 62,17, 976 P.2d 1224. Factual findings made by the trial 
court are "reversed only if clearly erroneous." State v. Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46,19, 79 P.3d 937 (quotations and citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Trial Court had Jurisdiction to Extend Orr's Probation 
18 Orr argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend 
his probation because one or more necessary events'2' did not occur 
prior to the expiration of his original probation term on May 12, 
2003. (3) The trial court determined that AP&P filed its violation 
report on May 9 and that this filing tolled the running of Orr's 
probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (2003). Accordingly, the 
trial court found that it had jurisdiction to extend Orr's probation. 
19 Orr argues that AP&P's probation violation report was filed on 
May 13, rather than May 9 as found by the trial court. "A trial 
court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error." 
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,160, 28 P.3d 1278. 
To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, 
the defendant "must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports the trial court's findings. After marshaling the 
supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even 
when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the trial court's findings." 
Id. (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1l7 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108) 
(emphases omitted). Viewing the trial court's decision in the most 
favorable light, we conclude that it is supported both by the date 
stamp on the document and by the testimony of AP&P agent Egelund--
testimony that the trial court specifically found to be "credible." 
We affirm the trial court's factual determination that AP&P filed its 
violation report on May 9. 
fllO "The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing 
of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the 
terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to 
show cause or warrant by the courtT"" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11) (b) 
(2 003) (emphases added). Accordingly, the trial court properly found 
that the May 9 filing of the violation report tolled the expiration 
of Orr's probation. Orr's original term of probation therefore had 
not yet expired when he received notice or when the court entered its 
extension order, and the court had jurisdiction to extend Orr's 
probation. (4) 
II. The Extension of Orr's Probation Had a Sufficient Factual Basis 
til Orr next argues that the trial court had no authority to 
extend his probation because it did not make a specific factual 
finding that he willfully violated his probation terms. By statute, 
"[p]robation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court 
that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (a) (I) (2003) (emphases added) . The record 
before this court adequately reflects the trial court's factual 
determination that Orr violated the terms of his probation by failing 
to make complete restitution. It was undisputed that Orr had been 
ordered to pay over $350,000 in restitution and had actually paid 
approximately $35,00 0. The record of Orr's hearing is replete with 
statements from the trial court indicating the court's acceptance of 
this factual basis, as is the court's written order.^ We conclude 
that the trial court properly found that Orr had violated the 
conditions of his probation by failing to complete the required 
restitution. 
fl2 Orr argues that even if he did fail to comply with the 
probation terms, extension of his probation was improper because the 
trial court made no finding that his probation violation was willful. 
Willfulness is not an express statutory requirement for either 
extension or revocation of probation under section 77-18-1(12). 
However, this court has stated that "to revoke probation, a violation 
of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful." State 
v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Absent a finding 
of willfulness or fault on the part of the probationer, revocation of 
probation is appropriate only if a violation is found to "presently 
threaten the safety of society," id. at 277, or, in the case of 
failure to make payments of money] if other alternatives to 
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imprisonment are found to be inadequate to meet the State's interests 
in punishment and deterrence. See id. at 276; see also Bearden v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671-72 (1983) (holding that to revoke 
probation for failure to make money payments the sentencing court 
must either find that the probationer was at fault or that other 
alternatives to imprisonment are inadequate). 
Ul3 Probation revocation necessarily involves the loss of a 
significantly greater interest--the probationer's liberty--than does 
the mere extension of probationary status. Indeed, the value of the 
right to personal liberty appears to have been the underlying basis 
of the Hodges decision: 
"The right to personal liberty may be as valuable to one 
convicted of a crime as to one not so convicted, and so long 
as one complies with the conditions upon which such right is 
assured by judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of 
the same. Such right may not be alternatively granted and 
denied without just cause." 
Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (quoting State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 
259 P. 1044, 1046 (1927)). Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
requirements of Hodges can be applied to the extension of probation, 
we conclude that the trial court fulfilled those requirements. 
1l4 The trial courtf s extension order stated that " [Orr] is 
induced to repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of 
probation and the threat of incarceration is held over him" and that 
"[Orr's] only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to 
avoid his probation being revoked." These statements constitute clear 
findings that "alternatives other than [the extension of Orr's 
probation] are inadequate to meet the state's interest in punishment 
and deterrence." Id. No further finding of "just cause" is required. 
Id. 
III. Probation May Be Extended Only in Increments of the Original 
Probation Term 
1l5 Orr argues, and the State concedes, that any extension of 
probation is limited to a renewal of the original probationary term. 
We agree. "Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions 
of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(12) (e) (ii) (2003) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
the trial court's extension of Orr's probation for ten years, the 
combined length of his suspended prison terms, was error. The 
extension of Orr's probation on this occasion should not have 
exceeded his original probation period of three years. 
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CONCLUSION 
fl6 We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its 
jurisdiction over Orr when it extended his probation. The trial court 
erred, however, by extending Orr's probation for a period of time 
greater than that allowed by Utah Code section 77-18-1. We reverse 
and remand this matter with directions that the trial 
court amend Orr's probation order in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
117 WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The trial court did not specify which version of Utah Code section 
77-18-1 it relied on. For purposes of this matter, section 77-18-1 
has not substantively changed since prior to Orr's sentencing, and we 
will cite to the current version for convenience. 
2. These events included AP&P's filing of the violation report, the 
court's issuance of an order to show cause, and the receipt of notice 
by Orr. 
3. The parties dispute whether Orr's probation term was originally 
scheduled to expire on May 12 or May 13. Because we conclude that the 
running of Orr's probation period was tolled on May 9, we do not 
reach this issue. 
4. We note that, in certain circumstances, application of the tolling 
provision, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (11) (b) (2003), might 
implicate the due process concerns expressed in State v. Call, 1999 
UT 42,111, 980 P.2d 201 (" [I]f it is the intent of the State to 
extend the probationary period beyond its original term, the State 
must take definitive action to extend the term before the expiration 
date, and the probationer must be given notice of that intent. 
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Otherwise, the probationer is left in a state of uncertainty, not 
knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his probation."). 
We are not convinced that the limited delay between the filing of the 
AP&P violation report on May 9 and Orr's receipt of notice on May 19 
creates such problems. 
5. At Orr's hearing, the trial court observed that " [On] hasn't paid 
a nickel on his restitution since he thought probation was over." 
Additionally, the court's July 2, 2003 order stated: 
[Orr's] failure to pay the May and June installments of his 
restitution underscores the fact that [Orr] is induced to 
repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of probation 
and the threat of incarceration is held over him. [Orr's] 
only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to 
avoid his probation being revoked . . . ." 
These statements reveal an implicit but clear finding that Orr had 
not paid the entire restitution amount ordered as a condition of his 
probation. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998) 
(upholding trial court's decision based on implicit factual finding 
regarding jury prejudice). 
